Republic Of Ireland 2-3 Russia

Russia run out deserved winners after winning comfortably -or at least more easily than the final scoreline suggests- what was supposed to be a tight clash  in Euro 2012 Group B qualifiers.

The starting line-ups

Giovanni Trapattoni played a fairly basic 4-4-2 with Keane and Doyle upfront. His starting 11 signified a lack of creativity -with the exception of McGeady, so a game plan based on strength and -irish- passion was expected. What was a bit harder to predict, was a plan chiefly based on direct balls to the attack.
In contrast, Advocaat's 4-3-3, using a mobile midfield trio, attacking full-backs and versatile attackers, finally displayed a recollection of Guus Hiddink's attractive football.

First Half (0-2)

Α classic 4-4-2 itself is probably fundamentally deficient compared to formations that tend to employ a packed midfield, e.g. a 4-3-3. Initially, there is an apparent numerical disadvantage  in that area. When it comes to intense pressing and ball retention, the players' roles  and the tactical approach become more demanding. Adding a superior opponent, particularly regarding technique and creativity as well as an one-dimensional attacking plan, they all give someone who did not watch the match a clue why Trapattoni's team were generally outplayed by the Russians.

Pressing

The Irish strikers attempted to press high, in contrast to the defense maintaining a relatively deep  line, resulting in a slapdash and disorganized pressing:

Img 1: The two Ireland strikers close down the defenders while the midfielders sit deeper, thus creating a gap. Moreover, the Russian holding players are not put under sufficient pressure and in consequence they often have more than one free passing options.

As previously discussed,  in a 4-4-2 vs 4-3-3 matchup, it may prove decisive whether at least one of the two forwards gets goalside of an opposition holding player, thus preventing a numerical disadvantage in midfield. Keane and Doyle failed to do that , often resorting in futile and ineffective runs towards the defenders.

Russian fluidity

The constant movement of the Russia players and the interchanging of positions between midfielders and attackers made their opponents' job much harder. Shirokov and Zyryanov joined the attack making frequent forward runs, whilst Arshavin and Dzagoev were much involved in the build-up play by occupying central positions. Therefore, Ireland's midfielders repeatedly found themselves dealing with 4 or 5 mobile Russians, whose fluidity and good touch on ball allowed them to circulate the ball with ease and have quick transition from defence to attack. Furthermore, Dzagoev and Arshavin's dropping deep along with Kerzhakov's moving in wide positions created space in front of Ireland's defensive line.

Img2                                Two cases indicative of how fluidly Russia's midfielders moved around : 

1) Dzagoev (yellow dot) drops into midfield, close to the central midfielders (blue dots) and receives the ball, Arshavin (orange) moves centrally as well, whilst Kerzhakov (red) stays wide and is picked up by O'Shea and Shirokov (blue-highest) occupies an advanced position, in front of the opposition central defenders. The over-crowded midfield obviously creates space on the left wing, which left-back Zhirkov can exploit.      

2) Arshavin and Dzagoev are close to the midfield trio, resulting in Zyryanov's running  forwards untracked. Kerzhakov drifts left, stretching the defence, thus creating space for the onrushing duo. Well organized counter attack, considering a midfielder is allowed to run centrally.

As indicated above (Img2-part1),  with the Russians repeatedly having a spare man in midfield, Ireland's wingers were often forced to cut inside, aiming the "suffering" holding players. Therefore, the visitors' full backs were libarated to push forward and this is where the second goal came from:

Img3 Arshavin (orange) is once again behind Dzagoev (yellow) and Shirokov (blue), with all 3 of them staying close together. McGeady tucks in to aid Whelan against Arshavin, leaving a huge space behind him, which Anyukov exploits before delivering a low cross for Dzagoev to convert. Arshavin's withdrawn role disorganized the defence, nonetheless McGeady's defending was also poor. 

Long balls
Hardly able to retain possession, Ireland were restricted to direct balls to the attack. Those long balls put some pressure on the opposition defense, though rarely to a large extent , considering  the number of them (particularly the ones coming from goal kicks, as Given did not played the ball to thedefenders for the entire first half). Furthermore, placing 4 or 5 players trying to win the header in rather little space, made Ireland vulnurable to counter attacks:

Img4   (1) Four Irish too close to each other, looking for the header - When the ball was lost they all found themselves behind it (2), thus leaving the holding players against Russia's midfielders, who then looked for  the space to launch a counter attack. Here Kilbane tracks Dzagoev high up the pitch.

Moreover, the Ireland players failed to work the flanks and cross from wide areas: In order keep possession in midfield,  the wingers cut in to receive a pass but the full backs -particularly O'Shea- were reluctant to push forward, while the strikers often played quite close to each other.

Yet, the hosts had a good chance to score first in the 8th minute, when Keane's cross bounced off the bar, before McGeady got his shot just wide of the post. Only a few minutes later, Kerzhakov opened the scoring for Russia: Arshavin hit a free kick from the left channel, Given couldn't hold onto the ball so Ignashevich found Kerzhakov in the 6-yard box with an overhead kick and the Zenit striker easily put the ball in the back of the net. Zonal marking cost Ireland, since 3 players decided to "mark" the goal line rather than Kerzhakov. Russia scored their second one in the 28th minute, confirming their domination in the first half.

Second Half (2-3)

Russia remained the better side, maintaining possession and moving fluidly all over the pitch and it didn't take long until Shirokov scored their 3rd goal, in the 50th minute. The Zenit midfielder found plenty of space outside the box, shot from 25 yards, the ball deflected off Dunne and found the net, so that he hosts' hopes for getting anything out of the match seemed over.

Trapattoni did not change much after half time. The full backs were less reluctant to venture forward -they had to anyway- and Doyle played a bit deeper. However, the long balls remained and the early signs of fatigue meant their pressing was becoming inconsistent. So, what changed and Ireland got back into the game? In tactical terms, there was not a twist that could have been proved decisive to the comeback.

Keane scored from the spot in the 71rst minute, after a rather harsh penalty decision and this goal seemed to re-inspire his teammates. Meanwhile, Trapattoni brought on 3 fresh midfielders (replacing Lawrence-Whelan-Doyle with Shane Long-Gibson-Fahey respectively) and went for a 4-4-1-1, playing McGeady behind Keane. In the last 20 minutes, Ireland were pushing men forward looking for the rebound from headers (thus leaving gaps behind) and managed to score a second goal in the 78th min, when Dunne won a high ball in the box, Akinfeev saved McGeady's shot but couldn't do the same against Long's, who was following up. It was the visitors' turn to defend carelessly, allowing a 5vs5 situation in their area.
The Russians looked more uncomfortable dealing with the high balls in the final minutes, yet they remained very dangerous on the counter atttacks and only failed to score a fourth because of Pogrebniak's complacency.

The brilliant Russian side dominated the game and provided some moments of really attractive football. On the other hand, it was probably Ireland's worst performance under Trapattoni, who was openly criticised for his tactics.  The question for the manager of the side that did not travel to South Africa because of a "handball", is to re-combine passion, strength and altruism with the requirements of a more "modern" tactical approach. The arguments about the players' selection have been always following poor performances, especially in national teams. It is highly questionable whether Ireland do have the players to "play like Russia" . The point is they don't have to.